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·Grant Duncan and John Nimmo* 
~n the_context_ of industrial relations, New Zealand's accident compensation scheme (ACC) 
zs an mternatzonal/y ~nique system. Recent reforms have been criticised by trad . ~;~~:;·i The~ percefizve AhCC a~ a P_Ositive benefit of employment obtained for w;/:::::n:~ 
n exc ange or t e extmguzshment of the right to sue Any threat to th · · 
as a threat to workers ' conditions of employment. The 199 2 ;eforms h b zs ~~ ~een 
by_ bu~in~ss leaders, on the other hand, for not going far enou h :;:n e~~ crztzczsed 
przvatzsatz?n and maintaining one of the bastions of welfare de en~en ~n e r~ad of 
these tenszons, the present article examines the history of the scheme tc,[· the l~~ht of 
and some implications for the future of ACC. ' e current reJorms 
The history of the scheme 
Prior to 1974, accident victims in New Zealand could seek com f d 
through a number of avenues. These were summar. d . pensa ton an support 
Commission of Inquiry (1967) headed by Sir Owen Wo~:ou::. a report by the Royal 
Firs~, an injured person could seek compensation for dama thr 
neghgence action. According to the Woodhouse Rep rt hges . ough a common-law 
less than one percent of all accident victims M o fu sue actiO~ only ever benefited 
lengthy and the chance of a successful out~omeor:ver,. e court ac~wn was_ seen to be too 
negligence could be proven. predtctable, particularly tf contributory 
For workers injured in the course of employment who did not seek -
at common law remedies there were th . . or were unsuccessful 
1956. Under this legislation employers ;o~~~vi~~:~ t~~:::seelWorker~ Co:pensation ~ct 
a range of private insurers althou h . . ves agamst ese costs wtth 
Provided under thi h ' g a rrunonty were able to self-insure. The benefits s sc erne were seen to be · d t b w 
a low ceiling which did not compensate fort::~u~:ss :f eoo~ouse because they had 
scheme covered only work-related injuries Th . . :rungs. Furthermore, the 
were left to seek benefits from the means~teste~s~~~~=f~c~=tydue tto non-wothrk injuries 
fend for themselves. sys em, or o erwtse to 
Massey University, Albany 
/' 
ACC: The Impact of Reforms 289 
The Woodhouse Report 
The system that the Royal Commission of Inquiry (1967) proposed is summarised in five 
principles: 
Community responsibility 
Comprehensive entitlement 
Complete rehabilitation 
Real compensation 
Administrative efficiency. 
The concept of community responsibility rests on the premise that the whole community 
both benefits from and promotes the very activities (employment, sports, driving, 
housework) which result in statistically predictable and inevitable injuries. The costs 
resulting from these incidents must therefore be borne by the community. This principle 
is clearly divergent from the individualist theories, such as public choice theory (Boston, 
1991) espoused by many policy-makers today. It set the scene, however, for a system 
which eschews the laying of individual blame and shares the cost of injuries evenly across 
all funders. 
By comprehensive entitlement the Woodhouse Report intended that cover for personal 
injury should not be determined differently according to when and where the injury 
occurred. Thus, a worker injured at home loses as much as a worker injured at work. The 
different cause of accident does not alter the outcome in terms of loss, and the loss to the 
individual is conceived of as a loss to the community. The Royal Commission extended 
the same principle to the non-worker, citing in particular "the housewife" and her valuable 
contribution in supporting the productive labour of workers. In short, work-related injuries 
should not be privileged in terms of cover by a social insurance agency. 
The lengthy delays and the need to prove damages in the negligence action were seen to 
be a disincentive to the rehabilitation of the injured person and as a cost to both individual 
and community. Rehabilitation should therefore be provided as a service since money in 
itself does not achieve that end. Woodhouse maintained that, in his proposed compensation 
authority, the needs of rehabilitation should never be overshadowed by the administration 
of compensation benefits. 
The basic meaning of real compensation lies in the tying of benefit levels to what the 
injured person lost as a result of the injury, rather than to whatever he or she may need. 
An affluent society creates for itself higher expectations and is also able to afford higher 
compensation levels, and both economic and non-economic, physical losses should be taken 
into account. Woodhouse rejected needs-based and flat-rate benefits in favour of 
compensation of a percentage of lost income. 
Finally, administrative efficiency is self-evident, but the point had to be made given the 
large number of private profit-making insurers and lawyers who benefited from servicing 
the pre-197 4 scheme. This historical point should give us pause before we assume that a 
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~rivatized sy~te~ ~11 automatically produce the same service more efficiently. Efficiency 
~~e ~omrmsswn s term~ ~eant returning the greatest proportion possible of the scheme's 
s mto the h~ds of InJured pers?ns as op~osed to lawyers and insurance company 
shareholders. Little thought was paid to efficiency in terms of the overall cost of th 
scheme or management decision-making. e 
The W ~o?bouse report is clearly the policy document of a time of low unemployment high pro~~ctlvity, affluence and traditional gender roles. It does not consider what happ~ns to 
an IDJW:ed worker ~hose employment terminates during the period of incapacity. No 
mechamsm was envisaged by Woodhouse for a transition from the status of accident victim 
to that of unem~loyed person. Moreover, it is assumed that such a scheme would remain 
affordable, and mdeed was most desirable given the affluence of modem society. 
:ne "W_ oodhou~e report clearly pom:ays a division of labour between the genders: while the 
~orlci?g man must b~ supported m order to return him to productive work with minimal 
disruptiOn, the houseWife -who "makes it possible for the productive work to be done" _ 
should also ~e covered because of her essential contribution to society (p.21 ). This does 
not. translate mto eq~ benefits, however, because such a non-earner housewife would be 
entitled to compensatiOn for permanent disability only, and not for loss of earnings. 
These ~sumptions of sustained high employment and productivity as well as th 
assumptiOn that "women" and "workers" are separate categories sho~ the Woodhous: 
report to be a product of its times, the mid-1960s. ' 
The other .major innovation suggested by the Woodhouse report was that such a 
co~prehensive scheme be based on the no-fault principle. This meant that compen f 
entitlement should ~e assessed "irrespective of fault and regardless of cause" (p.17~ .. 0~t 
was felt .that the action for dam~ges had not been a fair and consistent remedy for injured 
person~~ the past. Moreo~er, It had been pursued with success by fewer than one percent 
oinhif ~b~ md~ured ~ersons, ~hile the lengthy delays involved and the need to prove fault 
Ite effective rehabilitation. 
From this liftin~ o~ responsibility and fault from the individual in favour of the community 
~ollowed the prmciple ~at the scheme would have to be compulsory. There would be one 
msurer and no. contractmg out of the scheme. Funds would be gathered by a compulsory 
scheme of levies on employers and motor vehicles, with the government supplementing 
other costs for non-earners' non-vehicle-related injuries. 
The Accident Compensation Corporation 
After some vacillation by central government, it was decided to enact legislation which 
almost full~ follo':ed Woodhouse's recommendations. The crucial principle was that of 
comprehensive entitl~ment. Only after a change in government was the Act amended and 
~~ N.ew Zealanders given 24-hour cover for personal injury, rather than covering workers' 
InJunes only. The final decision to extend cover to all personal injury (thus rem · 
cases from the Social Security system) was hailed by many as a progressive and ~:~:h~=-~ 
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decision and probably helped maintain a belief in New Zealand's "world leadership" role 
among welfare states at that time. 
The only significant aspect of the Woodhouse Report to be altered was in compensation for 
permanent disability. The recommended periodic payments for permanent disability were 
replaced by a system of lump sums. 
So, from 1 April 1974, all New Zealanders - and visitors to New Zealand - were 
comprehensively covered for personal injury by accident (including industrial diseases), 24 
hours a day without recourse to common-law actions for damages. The scheme provided 
entitlement to a range of benefits to the injured person and, in fatal cases, his or her 
dependants. These benefits were intended to support the injured person during the period 
of incapacity and recovery, providing compensation related to losses sustained and costs 
incurred as a result of injury. This included permanent disability (lump sums based on an 
assessed percentage of disability), loss of earnings (set at 80 percent of previous income), 
funeral costs, treatment costs and rehabilitation. 
The problem, however, was the eventual fmancial cost of the scheme. In any injury 
compensation scheme involving income maintenance, it is the small minority of long-term 
claims which eventually creates the biggest financial burden. By 1992, new claims 
registered and compensated in that financial year comprised 59 percent of all claims paid. 
They accounted, however, for only 21 percent of all compensation costs. Funding the "tail" 
of old claims was becoming an ever-increasing burden, and the total cost of the scheme was 
rising at an annual rate well in excess of inflation (see Figure 1 ). Between 1977 and 1992, 
the average annual increase in expenditure had been 22 percent. Balanced against high 
unemployment and poor economic growth, such escalating costs could eventually begin to 
outweigh the funding base which supports the scheme. · 
The flip-side of the problem of the cost of the scheme is how to fund it. Figure 2 shows 
the different sources of income for ACC by percentage of the total. Until 1984, ACC' s 
income had been maintained at a level in excess of expenditure. This had allowed the 
Corporation to build up reserves of capital sufficient to cover more than 12 months costs. 
Through investment of those funds, the Corporation could further supplement its income, 
and it could absorb sudden influxes of claims from a natural disaster. The ideal would have 
been to maintain a fully-funded system whereby current reserves would be sufficient to pay 
for all future liabilities from current open claims. Figure 1, which maps annual income and 
end-of-year reserves alongside expenditure, shows that, while expenditure has risen 
smoothly, government regulation of ACC's income -and hence ACC reserves -has taken 
some sudden U-tums. The will to maintain a fully-funded scheme was lost in 1984. By 
1987, the scheme had used most of its reserves and was virtually bankrupt. This situation 
was reversed only by a radical increase in the levy on employers which returned fmancial 
reserves to an adequate level by 1990. Funding policies in more recent years, however, 
reflect a lack .of willingness to fully-fund the scheme. 
ACC's financial policy is now to maintain a "pay-as-you-go" system, meaning that "the 
scheme has to have enough income each year to pay for that year's out-goings on claims", 
while the optimal level of financial reserves is considered to be the equivalent of six 
months' expenditure (ACC, 1992: 41). By 30 June 1993, reserves had fallen below that 
level. 
292 
en 
0 
c:: 
c:> 
!1? 
)> 
0 
0 
)> 
::J 
::J 
c:: 
~ 
:n 
CD 
"0 Q 
~ 
Grant Duncan and John Nimmo 
$000s 
0 
I\) 
.::.. C) CD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1975 
19 76 
1977 
1978 
19 7 9 
1980 
198 1 
1982 
1983 
198 4 
1985 
1986 
198 7 
1988 
1989 
1990 
199 1 
1992 
1993 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
C) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
)> 
0 
0 
)> 
z 
z 
c )> 
r-
m 
X 
., 
m 
z 
0 
::; 
c 
:::0 
_m 
z 
0 
0 
~ 
m 
Qo 
m 
z 
9 
0 
71 
-< m )> 
:::0 
:::0 
m (J) 
m 
:::0 
< m 
en 
~ 
c 
:n 
m 
ACC: The Impact of Reforms 293 
The anomaly between injury and illness 
The victims of accidents covered by ACC have enjoyed a more generous scheme in terms 
of income maintenance and medical treatment subsidies than did those incapacitated by 
illness. The latter were only entitled to a low flat-rate sickness benefit and the less 
generous general medical benefits. This appeared to imply that the victims of accident were 
considered a more "deserving" group of needy persons than the sufferers of chronic illness. 
Woodhouse himself was aware of this anomaly, and believed it could only be addressed by 
the eventual provision of benefits of equal generosity and scope for illness. Although this 
had been considered seriously by the fourth Labour Government, it remains unaddressed 
under the new Act. 
Industrial diseases have always been included under ACC cover, but aside from this, the 
ACC scheme has biased many doctors and patients towards establishing that a specific 
condition is personal injury rather than illness. Back pain, to take the most notorious 
example, if it can be attributed to an incident of heavy lifting rather than the ageing process, 
may attract subsidies for treatment and compensation for time off work which would not 
otherwise be available. Given the impossibility of accurately diagnosing the causes of most 
episodes of back pain (Haldeman, 1990), it is hardly surprising that a blurring of the 
boundaries of ACC cover can occur here. 
Common talk around many workplaces (particularly from disgruntled managers) focuses 
on which of the local doctors has been identified as the "soft touch" for an ACC medical 
certificate. It is misleading to speak of "abuse" of the scheme in these cases, though, when 
such behaviour is only symptomatic of the continuing anomaly by which the creation of 
ACC has advantaged the injured over the ill. 
The 1992 reforms 
On 1 July 1992 the Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance (ARCI) Act 1992 
came into force. 
While many commentators have emphasised the changes and the "cuts" in the new scheme, 
it is important to realise that many of its original principles are still retained, particularly 
that of 24-hour, no-fault coverage for personal injury. This means that anyone in New 
Zealand - as well as New Zealanders travelling overseas - who suffers personal injury (as 
defined by the Act) will be covered by ACC. Once cover is established, usually 
immediately after the first medical treatment, the injured person may then apply for further 
entitlements, such as weekly compensation, rehabilitation, household help or independence 
allowance. 
The primary intentions of the ARCI Act 1992 were to make the accident compensation 
scheme affordable and fairer. The reformist intentions of the 1992 Act are clearly 
summarised in its own words: ". . . to establish an insurance-based scheme to rehabilitate 
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and compensate in an equitable and financially affordable manner those persons who suffer 
personal injury" (Long Title: italics added). 
An explicit intention of the National Government was to change ACC from a rights-based 
social insurance agency which disburses benefits into an organisation operating on 
commercial insurance principles paying tightly defined entitlements to injured persons 
covered under the Act. This means that everyone who benefits as an insured person should 
contribute fmancially to the scheme, and it should be clearly delineated as to exactly what 
benefits would be available. Furthermore, premiums (a term which replaced the old 
"levies") would be rated according to the cost of claims from an employer - or even an 
individual. In other words, you get what you pay for, and pay for what you get. The 
exception to this rule is the non-earner whose premium is paid by a Government 
contribution. 
The notion of making the scheme "fmancially affordable" reflects the perception that the 
scheme was fast becoming unaffordable (see Figure 1). Affordability is a relative notion, 
however - it is relative to one's ability to pay, and the priority accorded to the product 
concerned. As a proportion of GDP, the cost of ACC had risen from 1.04 percent in 1987 
to 1.57 percent in 1991. Individual employers were paying, on average, $1.71 per $100 of 
payroll in the year to 30 June 1992. The perception of the affordability of such costs must 
be affected by the ideological commitment of government, employers and taxpayers to the 
socialised, compulsory scheme in place. In other words, it should not be taken for granted 
that the old scheme was no longer affordable. 
As described above, the scheme is funding a growing "tail" of old claims. Since over half 
its claims expenditure is in income maintenance to injured persons, it is obviously the 
long-term maintenance of the injured earner on compensation for loss of earnings which is 
proving to be the greatest cost burden. It is these cases which will be targeted in order to 
achieve the Government's objective of establishing a "financially affordable" scheme. 
ACC's 1993 financial statements -which were released to Parliament only under pressure 
from the Opposition - show that the new scheme has already achieved a reduction in the 
rate of growth in expenditure (see Figure 1 ). This is despite the clearing of a large backlog 
of lump sum entitlements under the old Act. Much of these savings has come through 
reducing the levels of treatment fees and through a reduction in the numbers of new 
work-related claims. ... 
Cover under the new Act 
Another obvious way to make the sc,heme more affordable would be to limit how many 
claims can be awarded cover. Restricting entry into the scheme required that legislators 
ensure that the categories of cover and the definitions of key words such as "accident" be 
clear, unambiguous and able to exclude incontestably the kinds of borderline "injuries" 
which have in the past been allowed into the scheme and broadened its boundaries. 
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. ver under the Act are: personal injury caused by acc~d~nt, 
The five cate~ones of ~~cal misadventure, consequences of treatment for personal ~~ury 
occupational disease, me . . f claims come under the heading of personal mJury 
and sexual abuse. The grea~ maJonty ~ 1 th t the conditions defining the word "accident" 
sed by accident, and so It was crucla a . 
cau lear in order to prevent a rapid growth m costs. be very c 
. . k ara ra h in the interpretation of "accident" read: 
At the introductiOn of the Bllthl, thhe ey pb dyg :here that event involves the application of 
·fi ent external to e uman ° · · · ·ty 
"A speci lC ev . h . b rmal in application or excessiVe m mtensi .. 
1 £ or resistance t at lS a no . f t an extema orce . 1 thi d· "A specific event or senes o evens 
" By the time the Blll had become aw, s. r:_ . xternal to the human body and that 
· · . 1 the application of a force or res1s ce e " that mv.o ves 1 . . but does not include any gradual process . . . . 
results m persona mJUfY, 
. . f the hrase "series of events", and the removal 
The two main changes were the addi~10n o p . ·n intensity" This created several 
, b 1 in applicatwn or excessive I · . d 
of the phrase a norma . . . n into the scheme. ACC policy contmue 
problems for the Corp~ratwn m controlhn~ e tryon 1 July) to interpret the definition of 
(after the implementatiOn of .~h~ n:als~n e;;lication or excessive in intensity" were still 
accident a: t~ough the phrase a ~o . its effect. It had an impact particularly on ~por:s 
there. This I~ more th~ academic m had been injured by simply running or jumpmg m 
injuries. For mstance, If a sportsperson. ld refuse to cover the injury. Some of these 
a perfectly normal manner, th~ CorporatiOn wouN t also that the definition of "accident" 
kinds of injuries can be particularly ls:v~re. haso :ccurred shall not of itself be construed 
provides that "the fact that ~ persona. mJurY d by any such event or series of events". 
as an indication or presumptiOn that It was ~~use d sn't mean it was one caused by an 
In other words, just because you have an mJury oe 
accident as covered by the Act. 
The other new difficulty was in the dis~:~n ~::~e:: ~:1;sc:Je;;~n:; :~ :r~r:.: 
process. Personal mJune~ cau;ed bX.lra pJies to these. The addition of the phrase 
injuries, and a whole senes .~ con.~ IO~~ \ .. re-o ened opportunities for cover under the 
"series of events" to the defimtwn of accl en . p · ld be said to be due to a 
Act. For instance, an injury caused by long-distance runrung cou 
series of events and not a gradual process. 
. . h C oration's interpretation of the Act arose as 
A clamour of complamts agamst t e orp . . ACC cover in July 1992. The main 
patients began to feel the effects of the n.e"':' cnten~· f~r argued that a person injured while 
critique came from the Medical Assocmtwn, w IC. is an external force and the ground 
running should b: covere(dLbecaus~ ;~~)fo~~eo~~:~~~ion's continued insistence that it be 
is an external resistance aracy, · . . 
somehow abnormal force or resistance was not legitimate. 
. . 1 on the force of lobby group action. A 
Eventually, the Corporatl~~ b~cked do~~u~~:ation Insurance Corporation, 1992) was 
bulletin (Accident Rehabihtatwn and . p d fi .f of "accident" It states quite 
published for treatment providers to explal~ the newh e Irunnru lO~g long dis~ces or twisting 
. · · sed by normal actwns sue as d 
clearly that mJuries cau d b th A t thus including most forms of "sprains an 
while getting out of bed are covere y e . c ' e of more than a month's duration, 
strains". A gradual process is usually con~Ider~~ t~ ~olicy interpretation had maintained. 
as opposed to anything over 24 hours, as t e ongma 
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Those legitimate claims that were previously declined cover were able to be reviewed by 
the Corporation, and the initial decisions were overturned. 
In effect, then, despite the Corporation's attempts to control entry to the scheme, the policy 
on cover for personal injury caused by accident did not succeed in making ACC harder to 
get into. One of the main means for improving the affordability of the scheme had failed, 
much to the relief of many doctors and their patients. Although a cost-cutting measure was 
clearly behind the attempt to defme "accident" restrictively, there is relatively little that was 
covered under the old legislation that is not covered now. The new Act attempts to be 
more precise, but no definition will ever be water-tight. Some things which are now 
specifically excluded, though, are injuries or illnesses due to non-physical stress and the 
effects of passive smoking and air-conditioning systems. These all have implications for 
the workplace. Traumatic mental consequences of witnessing another person's death will 
also be excluded now. 
Campbell (1992) argues that the definition of "accident" should be established in the courts 
by precedent, rather than by statute. His concerns over the impacts of the new 
interpretation may have been justified at the time his article was written, but subsequent 
events should have alleviated those fears. Some finer aspects of the new definition, such 
as the distinction between "series of events" and "gradual process", will no doubt be 
decided in the long term by precedent. 
As for industrial illnesses (section 7 of the Act), their definition will always be much more 
difficult because their causes are so often harder to identify. The basic criteria here are: 
firs~, the identification of a causal property or characteristic in the worker's job or work 
environment; second, that same causal property is not found "to any material extent" in the 
~or~er's activities or environment outside work; and, third, performing that worker's job 
m his or her place of work creates a risk of suffering the disease which is "significantly 
greater" than for those who do not do that job in that environment. For cases such as 
hearing loss, occupational overuse syndrome and diseases covered by section 7, it will 
clearly be a matter of continual debate as to what is meant by "to any material extent" and 
"significantly greater risk". Here there is plenty of opportunity for the courts to interpret 
the law. 
The effects of experience rating 
~J~ough previous legislation empowered ACC to implement an experience rating system, 
It ~s only under the new scheme that it has been more thoroughly pursued. E~perience 
rati.ng means that an employer's premium is adjusted up or down according to a formula 
which accounts for the payments on claims. received up to five years previously. The 
pres~nt scheme assesses only historical ·costs rather than prospective risks. It presently 
apphes only to employers, particularly those paying over $10,000 per annum in premiums, 
but the Act does allow such rating to be applied to individuals. 
Na~rally,. ~xperience r~ting has caused employers to look more critically at any ACC 
clatms ar1smg from their workplaces. ' This has had various effects on the relationship 
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b tw nan in1ured worker and his or her employer. The employer may attempt to dissuade e ee " . . d. 1 b the employee from lodging a claim, possibly by reimbursmg any expenses rrect y, y 
on-site treatment and alternative duties, or by less scrupulous means. 
If a claim is inevitable, the employer has the right to dispute its status as work-related. 
These disputes are arbitrated, in the first instance, by an AC~ manager. In many cases, ~e 
t me of this dispute will only affect the employee m respect of the first week s ou co k · · F th 
ensation which would be paid by the employer for a wor InJury. or o er cases, 
comp . .al d. t. I 
especially injuries caused by gradual processes, such as mdustr1 Iseases or occupa wn~ 
overuse syndrome, the stakes are higher. These injuries can only be cove.red by ~CC ·~ 
they are work-related. If the employer proves otherwise, then no compensatiOn can e pa1 
by ACC. 
Because of the financial impact on the employer of the outcome. of ~ork injury ~isputes, 
some would argue that this procedure is reintroducing the attributiOn o~ fault mto the 
h e Making Such a determination can in many cases, be extremely difficult because sc em. , ' . . . . 
of the complexity of the legislation and the likelihood of confhctmg evidence bemg 
presented. The Corporation's decision-making powers in this respect do add up to the 
power to attribute fault to the employer. 
A more constructive response to experience rating is for the employer to invest more in 
accident prevention. At present, there appears to be conflict~ng opinion on ~e evide~ce that 
such systems do reduce accident rates. Chelius ( 1991) believes that expenence ratmg can 
have a positive role as an incentive for employers to improve safety .. Campbell (1.9~9), ~n 
the other hand, claims that there is no adequate evidence to back this up. The M1rustenal 
Working Party accepted this latter view and justified experience r~ting on th: .grounds ~f 
equity. Birch, as minister responsible for ACC, has held an ambiguous position on this 
issue however. On the one hand, he accepts the Working Party's position, while saying 
that ~xperience rating "will remind employers of the cost benefits of reducing the incidence 
of accidents" (Birch, 1991: 62, italics added). On another occasion, however, he referred · 
to the Health and Safety in Employment Act as a "big stick" while experience rating 
represents "the carrot of financial reward for employers with good safety records" (Birch, 
1992b: 3). It is difficult to tell whether he intended experience rating to benefit wor~ers 
by improving safety and health management, or only to benefit employers by spreadmg 
costs more equitably. 
In any case, previously, poorer performing employers had been unfairly subsidised by those 
with lower claims costs. Although justifiable on equity grounds, it is not certain that more 
effective accident prevention in industry will result from experience rating. Even if fewer 
work injuries and ACC claims do occur in future, it will not be possible to attribute this to 
experience rating alone, as the new Safety and Health in Employment Act 1992 also places 
new expectations and sanctions on employers and employees in this area. 
Since experience rating takes account of the overall costs of claims, it can also be affected 
by the length of time off work following an injury. Prompt rehabilitation of workers who 
have been injured at work will also reduce the employer's experience rating. The danger 
here is that employees may be pressured into returning to work inappropriately early. This 
should be avoided with adequate medical supervision. The greater interest likely to be 
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expressed by an employer in an early return to work would, m general, facilitate 
rehabilitation. 
Experience rating therefore will have effects on the relationship between employer and 
employee in certain specific ways. Work injury disputes are a new bone of contention not 
encountered under previous legislation, and the greater accountability applied to employers 
will mean much greater scrutiny of compensation claims. 
The exempt employers scheme 
Probably the most significant "thin end of the wedge" of privatisation of accident 
compensation is the provision in the new Act for exempt employer status. This will mean 
that employers will be able to assume direct responsibility for work injuries to their 
employees for the first 12 months after the date of injury. They must use the same 
conditions to assess whether the injury is covered as a work injury and provide the same 
rehabilitation, treatment and compensation entitlements as well as administering their own 
review procedures when the injured employee disputes a decision. 
It is this latter provision which has created the greatest suspicion from unions (Barber, 
1993). The exempt employer makes all initial decisions regarding the injured person's 
cover and entitlement. In the case of a dispute over any decision, however, the 
management of a review process, traditionally conducted by independent officers of ACC, 
will be conducted by the employer. The integrity and fairness of the exempt employers 
scheme thus rests to a large extent with the integrity of those employers who join the 
scheme. There is a potential for the unscrupulous manipulation of claims in order to reduce 
the employer's costs. Exempt employers may avoid accusations of self-interested 
manipulation if they contract an independent consultant to conduct review hearings. 
To give a balanced view, some employers will tend to be more responsive and lenient in 
favour of their own employees than ACC would. Exempt employers should be able to 
provide immediate care and rehabilitation to injured employees to encourage an early return 
to work. The scheme gives a financial incentive to manage the full range of an injured 
worker's needs from medical treatment to alternative duties whereas previously employers 
had left this entirely in the hands of ACC. By managing the administrative and finzmcial 
aspects of claims, the employer's closer knowledge of earnings should mean that they can 
provide prompt payment of weekly compensation without the employee having to approach 
an unfamiliar organisation. 
Exempt employer status will create an opportunity for private sector insurers to begin to 
establish a commercial relationship with exempt employers. Commercial insurers will seek 
to provide alternative cover for the 12 months for which the employer is directly liable for 
an injured worker's compensation. If the rebate from the ACC premium is adequate, this 
may justify the employer's adoption of full or partial commercial insurance for any direct 
liabilities. Such an arrangement would be particularly advisable to guard against the effects 
of a low probability event causing severe injuries. 
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According to Derek Larsen, a risk management consultant and insurance b.roker, "the 
insurance industry sees the new ARCI Act as an opportunity to offer alternative finance 
th ds both to individual employers or groups of employers should they elect to be me o , . . . 1 1 h t from insuring with ACC. Insurers see themselves asststmg parttcu ar y w ere a 
exemp If · th · k" (L 
small employer may not have a sufficiently large asset base to se -msure ens arsen, 
1992). 
The earners' premium 
Employers, who historically have contributed most of the funding o~ ~e scheme, were in 
effect paying for injuries which had not occurred at work. InJuries not caused by 
loyment could not have been prevented by the employer, and so that sector of the 
emp d . 1 
community was financially responsible for occurrences beyon 1ts contro . 
Government accepted this argument. From the perspective of the Ro~al Commission 
(1967), however, the employer still has a direct interest in ~e. financial support and 
rehabilitation of injured workers no matter where or when the InJury occ~rred. A good 
employer will want experienced staff to return to work as promptly as posstble, no matter 
what the cause of absence. Not all employers were insistent that the costs of workers' 
non-work injuries be removed from their account. 
Nevertheless, in order to help spread the increasing burden of cost, the ARCI ~ct 
establishes a premium (levy) from individual earners through the pay-as-you-earn taxatw.n 
system. This is intended to cover th~ costs of n~n-~ork inj~i~s sustained by earne~~· . ~his 
premium will increase in rate and stze of contrtbutwn as 1t ptcks up_ more of the ta1l of 
claims. The employers' contribution will thus slowly reduce (see Ftgure 2). 
Funding under the new Act operates on a more user-pays principle than before. Thus, 
earners now pay directly for the cost of non-work injuries. A levy on petrol means that all 
motor vehicle drivers - and not just owners - pay for road injuries. Medical practitioners 
will begin to pay a premium for medical misadventure claims. This, along ~th. experience 
rating, means that the costs are tied more closely to the user, and the fundmg 1s extended 
to more sources, thereby spreading the financial risk. 
The employers' account 
While it was always recognised that the cost of ACC levies was passed on by industry to 
the consumer, the government wishes to make New Zealand products and labour costs more 
internationally competitive. Shifting ACC costs of non-work injuries directly to the worker 
is undoubtedly an outcome of this strategy. The benefits of this to employers have not been 
immediately realised, however. The new Act makes employers pay for the public. ~ea~th 
costs of treating work injuries. This and the continuing costs of pre-1992 non-work mJurtes 
have so far cancelled out any significant reduction in employers' premiums. ACC's 
forecasting of income and expenditure in the employers' account for the 1993 financial ~ear 
was significantly inaccurate: although a shortfall of income was expected, ACC recetved 
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less in premiums and paid more in claims than was expected. This left the employers' 
account with only two months worth of reserves at 30 June 1993. It is likely that 
expenditure on work injuries will decrease in the 1994 year. It is unlikely, however, that 
significant reductions in employers' premiums will be possible in the short term, unless the 
account is to be managed on close to nil reserves. 
Given the possibility of the deregulation of work injury insurance, the fact that much of the 
employers' future liabilities is presently unfunded raises certain issues. If employers were 
able to cease contributing to ACC, their future liabilities would need careful consideration. 
Individual experience rating of employers now makes these costs at least known. If this 
history of claims is available to the insurance industry, they could provide a competitive 
quotation in an open market against the ACC levied cost. In effect, the insurance industry 
could pay the employer's remaining ACC premiums on their behalf, thus securing that 
customer's business through a single premium. 
The present political environment may make such a discussion purely academic, however. 
It seems unlikely that the Government in its present term will be able to muster the support 
for legislation deregulating any portion of ACC. Political pressure may instead bring about 
higher levels of compensation, in which case the rising costs would indicate the need for 
an adequate reserve in the Employers' Account. 
The abolition of lump sums 
The main difference which New Zealanders have noticed about the new scheme is the 
removal of entitlement to a lump sum award. These in the past represented only about 20 
percent of ACC's total expenditure. Their removal, however, means that an important 
aspect of the compensation scheme - which replaced the right to seek compensation for 
damages under common law - is no longer available. For non-earners (for example, 
children and their carers) who do not qualify for weekly, earnings-related compensation, 
the lump sum was their only significant income from ACC. It is now replaced by the 
independence allowance which will be a maximum of $40 per week. It is already apparent 
that even quite severely injured claimants will receive less than half the maximum. 
The old lump sums were always known to be much less than would be available by means 
of law suit or private insurance. The niche that the new legislation leaves open here 'is 
already being filled by private insurers offering lump sum entitlements (of, say, $50,000) 
for death or disability. 
The concept of a lump sum payment is central to any system of compensation for injury 
or damages, and its removal from ACC entitlements has created a public perception that 
ACC is not offering real compensation for personal injury. Many injured people will feel 
they may have received a better deal from private insurers or by pursuing the common-law 
right to sue denied them by the ARCI Act. Such public dissatisfaction has increased 
political pressure for a resumption of the right to sue. 
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The assessment of capacity for work 
To .ensur~ the affor~bil~ty . of the accident compensation scheme, the new legislation, 
havmg ~ailed to restrict ~Igmficantly entry into the scheme, attempts to limit expenditure 
by grantmg the CorporatiOn the right to cease weekly compensation for those assessed as 
over 85 percent fit for work. Weekly compensation for lost income represents over 50 
percent of all compensation claims expenditure, and so the long-term compensated workers 
who may be fit for work but have lost their jobs are the logical targets for cost-cutting. 
The Act's provision for vocational rehabilitation is intended to assist the injured person to 
return to work as soon as practicable. Nevertheless, an injured worker who is measured as 
8~ pe~cent or more fit for work and yet who no longer has a job to return to can be 
disentitle~ by the Corporation regardless of job availability. This stricter approach was 
never envisag~d by Woo~o~s~ (who was writing at a time of virtual full employment), and 
may be applied to an mdividual claimant quite independently of any efforts to use 
vocational rehabilitation. It is the "teeth" behind the policy of ridding the scheme of 
"hidden unemployment" (Birch, 1992a). 
~he scales. ~or measuring capacity for work are to be prescribed by regulation and, at the 
time ~f writmg, the~e re~ulations ~ad ~~t been passed. The Act says that such scales "may 
take .I~to account Impairment, disability and handicap for work" (s51(1)). It is not 
surpnsmg that the regulations were not passed in 1993, being an election year. The 
assessment of capa~ity for work and th~ provisions for cessation of compensation may 
eventually be perceived as the ARCI Act s most draconian measures. 
A field trial of the Work Capacity Test carried out on behalf of ACC (Kendall and Roy 
1992) conducted 235 assessments on a randomly selected sample of ACC claimants. Th~ 
results :were validated. against the professional judgements of physicians and significant 
correlatiOns were obtained. If these had been live tests, it appears that 55 percent of the 
sample w~uld have been deemed fit for work (i.e., they scored 85 percent or over on the 
test). Their weekly compensation could then be ceased on three months notice regardless 
of job availability. ' 
I~ ~sessing inter-rat~r reliability, the correlation coefficients obtained were largely 
sigru,~cant but not as high as w?ul~ be desira?le. The researchers were only able to report 
that the calculated work capacity IS more reliable than clinicians' opinion of work fitness" 
(p.23). The low reliability coefficients suggest a sufficiently large standard error to warrant 
disputes, particularly over scores close to 85 percent. 
Another weakness in the field trial is the small number of head injured claimants. ACC has 
repeatedly failed to take into account the special needs of the head injured in creating its 
assessment tools. 
The Work Capacity Test and the provision for cessation of weekly compensation are likely 
to be a so~ce of legal action through the District Courts. If pursued rigorously, they will 
also contribute to the numbers of unemployed. 
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The context of a "free" labour market 
The ARCI Act 1992 also needs to be seen in the cont~xt of an . overall . legislative 
programme of labour market reform carried out by Mr Birch. Basic premises of the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991 are, first, that it is best ~or the em~loyer .and ~e e~ployee 
t determine the conditions of employment most appropnate to their specific situatiOn, and, s~cond, the value of freedom of association. Legislation may set minimum (or minimal) 
standards and sanctions, but, by this reasoning, there should be no further compulsory 
systems dictating what benefits and obligations. of employment may be in place. As. an 
aspect of the total conditions of employment enJoyed by New Zealand workers, ACC IS a 
significant element. A public policy consistent with the Employment C~n:ra~ts Act would 
therefore simply set a minimum level of entitlements payable for work InJuries, and allow 
individual employers freedom to choose an appropriate insurer to underwrite the risk. 
Legislative control of citizens' common law rights would also see~ to be inconsistent with 
government's current deregulatory policies. The return ?f. the n~ht to sue wo~ld .be a 
prerequisite for privatisation of accident compensation. This m turn ~s a ce~tral pol.Icy Issue 
in the future of ACC given the implications it has for legal and mdustrial affairs. The 
recent campaign by the Engineers' Union to return "the right to sue the unsafe employer" 
(Speden, 1993) is a predictable response to the perceived removal of '~real compens~ti.on" 
under ACC. It implicitly provides further backing for the deregulatiOn of work InJury 
insurance, however, and therefore should be promoted by unions only if they also desire 
privatisation. 
Given the direction in which the National Government has sought to steer the labour 
market, it is perhaps surprising that the ARCI Act 1992 did not effect a full deregulation 
of ACC work injury cover. Given the provisions that were passed, however, it is likely that 
the 1992 Act is only intended as a station on the way to a privatized system (see: Duncan, 
in press). Concerning privatisation, we cannot ignore the opinion of the New Zealand 
Business Roundtable which clearly does not believe that the reforms of 1992 go far enough. 
They state that "The Accident Compensation Corporation should be c~rpora~ised and 
ultimately privatised and barriers to competition in the provision of accident msurance 
should be removed" (New Zealand Business Roundtable, 1992, p.35). It is now doubtful, 
however, that the necessary legislation would make it through Parliament. 
Conclusion 
Internationally, New Zealand's accident compensation scheme has attracted attention for its 
unique comprehensive, no-fault cover and its socialised, compulsory distribution of costs. 
This has been perceived as beneficial in terms of eliminating many costly and drawn-out 
legal processes and as a support for rehabilitation and injury prevention. It ~as, on the 
other hand, been criticised for unduly limiting citizens' access to legal remedies and for 
creating disincentives to effective prevention and rehabilitation while providing relatively 
meagre benefits. 
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The fate of the scheme will most probably be decided by its escalating costs, however. The 
financial costs are always easier to measure than the social benefits of any such programme. 
The ARCI Act (1992) has clearly been drafted with the benefit of the employer in mind. 
Although, in terms of privatisation of choice, it does not go as far as the Employment 
Contracts Act, it is similar in that the emphasis is placed on equity and cost-effectiveness 
for employers. Furthermore, it creates potential for workers to be disadvantaged if an 
emplo~er chooses to act ~ethically (for instance, it raises the likelihood that an employer 
may discourage the lodgmg of a legitimate claim). It effectively leaves many New 
Zealanders, especially the non-earner, without real compensation for permanent disability 
and with no right to sue. 
The new Act creates potential for new tensions and disputes in workplaces that were not 
encountered before, particularly with work injury disputes and experience rating. On the 
whole, the reformed scheme is more equitable to employers, especially in removing their 
payment of the costs of non-work injuries. From the point of view of workers, the reaction 
has been unfavourable: they now pay more in terms of premiums (essentially a new form 
of taxation) but are entitled to less in terms of "real compensation". 
There can be little doubt that the ARCI Act deliberately creates an environment which will 
favour the ultimate deregulation and privatisation of accident compensation, in line with the 
wi~hes of the B~sines~ Roundtable. This would entail the right to proceed with negligence 
actions.. If this pohcy were carried through, it would have major implications for 
occupatiOnal safety and health and industrial relations. Many New Zealanders would 
welcome the right to sue, but many others would regret the loss of a comprehensive social 
insurance system on which they had come to rely. With such a slim majority in the House, 
however, the logical conclusion to this trend toward privatisation may not be achievable for 
the present Government. 
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